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The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision
Roberta S. Karmel*
The rationale for the prohibition against trading on inside information
was first articulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) in Cady, Roberts & Co.,' an administrative proceeding in
which a director of an issuer who was also a principal of a brokerage firm
used undisclosed adverse information about the issuer-a decision to cut a
dividend-to recommend and effect the sale of securities for customers of
the broker.2 In holding that the director's actions violated Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act)3 the SEC stressed the existence of a relationship affording access to
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure.4
In SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. 5 the Second Circuit endorsed the
SEC's views in Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., finding that trading on
inside corporate information by corporate insiders and their tippees
violated the antifraud provisions by allowing insiders to profit from their
special access to sensitive information.6 According to the court, such
unfairness frustrates "the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information." 7 The SEC thereafter
argued that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws require a
parity of information among all traders in the public securities markets.8
In two important cases the Supreme Court rejected the principle that -
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act insures equality of information in the
* Professor Karmel is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for the
Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2. Id. at 908-10.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2017).
4. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911-12.
5. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
6, See id. at 848.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 857-58 (finding that an insider of a company has a duty to disclose to the public
market any material information that he may have possessed).
121
Journal of Law & Policy
public securities trading markets,9 or that buyers and sellers of securities
owe a general duty to the market place to disclose inside information or
abstain from trading.1 0 In Chiarella v. United States11 the Court held that
liability for silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
under Section 10(b) "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." 12
This case involved a financial printer who was able to deduce the
identities of takeover targets from documents sent to the printer, although
the names of the bidder and target were coded (apparently not very
cleverly). 3 The Court held that:
[N]o duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers
of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior
dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary,
he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.14
This language gave rise to the doctrine that liability under Section 10(b)
in an insider trading case requires the breach of a fiduciary duty in trading
on the information.' 5 Nevertheless, because of Chief Justice Burger's
language in a dissenting opinion in Chiarella, this case also gave rise to
the misappropriation doctrine: misappropriation of information by an
employee from an employer,1 6 or breach of an attorney-client or other
fiduciary relationship might be sufficient to create a duty to the buyer or
seller. 17 The misappropriation doctrine was thereafter used by the SEC and
9. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
10. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
11. 445 U.S. 222.
12. Id. at 230.
13. Id at 222.
14. Id. at 232-33.
15. See id. at 227-28.
16. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-42 (Burger, J., dissenting) (finding that an employee "who
has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or refrain
from trading").
17. See id. at 243 (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "mere failure to disclose nonpublic
information, however acquired," is not a deceptive practice, but rather, the means by which the trader
acquired his informational advantage is critical to the finding of misappropriation).
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the Department of Justice (DOJ) in countless insider trading cases.' The
theory is unsound because it is based on the idea that the trader of
information was committing a fraud on the source of the information, but
the source could have traded on the information without violating the
law.19 Further, as I describe below, the misappropriation theory became
problematic in some tippee cases.
These problems became apparent in Dirks v. SEC 20 and United States
v. Winans.21 In Dirks, a security analyst and officer of a broker-dealer
received information from a former officer of Equity Funding Corporation
of America (Equity Funding) to the effect that Equity Funding's business
was entirely fraudulent. 22 Dirks conducted his own investigation and tried
23to publicize his findings. He then apprised his clients of the fraud and
many of them sold their Equity Funding stock before the facts became
public and the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 to less than $15
a share.24 Although Dirks did not have a client or fiduciary relationship
with Equity Funding, the SEC charged him in an administrative
proceeding, holding that "where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation
or occupation-come into possession of material 'information that they
know is confidential, and know or should know came from a corporate
insider,' they must publicly disclose that information or abstain from
trading" on it.2 5 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the SEC's decision on a
ground not argued by the Commission: that Dirks, by virtue of his
fiduciary position as a securities analyst associated with a broker-dealer,
was subject to a broad legal disclosure obligation in favor of the public at
large.26 The Supreme Court rejected all of these theories, holding that a
18. See U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see also SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
2003); see also SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
19. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229; see also Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d
159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
20. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
21. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd in part, 484
U.S. 19 (1987).
22. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
23. Id. at 649-50
24. See id. at 649-50.
25. Id. at 651 (citing 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (quoting Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S.
222, 230, n. 12 (1980)).
26. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd 463 U.S. 646 (explaining that
the "obligations, implicit in the scheme of broker-dealer registration under the federal securities laws,
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tippee cannot be held liable under Section 10(b) unless use of the
information breaches a fiduciary duty that the tipper owed to either his
clients or his organization, and in addition, the insider must have realized a
personal benefit.27
R. Foster Winans was a Wall Street Journal columnist who profited
from trading in securities in advance of stories he wrote for his Heard on
the Street column. 28 He also tipped his roommate, and both of them were
prosecuted.2 9 Initially, the SEC brought a civil action against Winans on
two different theories. 3 0 One was that he breached his duty to his readers
by not disclosing his intentions to profit on price movements expected
from his stories about corporate matters. 31 The government's other theory,
then used to prosecute Winans criminally, was that he violated his duties
of honesty, loyalty and confidentiality to his employer by in effect
misappropriating and trading on information about the contents of
forthcoming columns.32 The Second Circuit affirmed Winans' conviction
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and the mail fraud statute in a 2-
1 split decision. 33 The dissenting judge pointed out that use of the
misappropriation theory in this case was ludicrous since the government
had admitted that the Wall Street Journal could have traded on this
information. 34 The criminal case then went to the Supreme Court, which
also split 4-4, so Winans' conviction was affirmed.35
Chiarella, Dirks and Winans were misguided prosecutions, serving as
examples of bad cases making bad law. None of these defendants really
stole information belonging to others, and to some extent the defendants
came to their trading conclusions based on their own efforts to dig out
36facts. Justice Powell, who wrote the opinions in both Chiarella and
provide a basis for imposing a duty to disclose-or-refrain" on those associated with broker-dealers due
to "the importance of broker-dealers within the securities markets" where "broker-dealers [are]
required to meet a high standard of ethical behavior in their activities").
27. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-64.
28. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 844.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1025 (2d Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 1037 (Miner, J., dissenting).
35. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
36. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22-23. See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1983);
124 [Vol. 56:121
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Dirks, rejected the SEC's broad parity of information principle for insider
trading, limiting Section 10(b) by the common law.37 But Congress passed
the federal securities laws as broad remedial legislation to make the public
securities markets fair and equitable and to instill confidence in those
markets and in investors because the common law was inadequate to do
so.38 In addition, Justice Powell tacked on the personal benefit requirement
in Dirks without any real analysis or justification.3 9 The purpose of the
personal benefit requirement was to limit liability and not leave insider
trading prosecutions to the prosecutorial discretion of the SEC.4 0 Surely, it
would have been better to develop a doctrine to distinguish between
diligent research and information obtained through dishonest methods. On
the other hand, the SEC should have developed such a doctrine rather than
trying to cast the widest possible net to catch insider traders.
Many years ago, I argued that the prohibitions against trading on
inside information should be justified as necessary to enforce the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the securities laws. 41 Further, instead
of trying to suppress the use of nonpublic information, the SEC should
encourage more rapid disclosure of material information. 42 Thereafter,
these ideas were taken up to some extent by the SEC and the Congress by
the adoption of Regulation FD,43 which requires public companies to make
prompt disclosure if material information is given, intentionally or
inadvertently, to a securities analyst or other securities professional, and
by the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires
accelerated disclosure timelines for annual and period reports by public
companies."
The difficulties in distinguishing between legitimate research by
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
37. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28.
38. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
39. See 463 U.S. at 647.
40. United States v. Martorna, 869 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J., dissenting).
41. Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach in Search of a
Duty, 20 CARDOzo L. REV. 83 (1998).
42. Id. at n. 40.
43. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881 (Aug. 15,
2000).
44. See Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website Access
to Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8128, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480 (Sept. 16, 2002).
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securities industry professionals and inside information subject to the
disclose-or-abstain rule were highlighted by recent cases involving
portfolio managers.45 In United States v. Newman a group of financial
analysts who were remote tippees received information from insiders at
two public companies that disclosed earnings numbers before they were
publicly announced. 6 The analysts then passed this information on to the
defendants, who were portfolio managers for hedge funds who earned $4
million and $68 million in profits.47 The defendants were three or four
steps away from the tippers and the case lacked any proof that they were
48
aware of the source of the inside information.
Although the portfolio managers were convicted, their convictions
were overturned by the Second Circuit on the ground that, under Dirks, in
order for a tippee to be guilty of insider trading, the government must
prove:
(1) The corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2)
the corporate insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing
confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal
benefit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper's breach, that is, he knew
the information was confidential and divulged for personal benefit;
and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or
tip another individual for personal benefit. 49
Further, the court took a narrow view of the personal benefit
requirement, holding that it should be objective, consequential, and
represent a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.o
Also, the tipper and tippee should have a meaningful close personal
relationship." This last requirement was later repudiated by the Second
Circuit.5 2
45. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Martoma, 869
F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
46. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 444.
49. Id. at 450; see United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2013); Dirks v. United
States, 463 U.S. 646, 659-64 (1983).
50. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
51. Id.
52. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
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The DOJ then looked for a case with better facts to challenge this
holding in the Supreme Court and found that case in Salman v. United
States.5 3 The Court upheld the conviction of a tippee of information
emanating from a former Citibank investment banker about mergers and
acquisitions by clients of the bank.5 The banker gave the information to
his brother, who in turn gave it to a friend and relative by marriage. The
Court simply reaffirmed the reasoning of Dirks in this case and held that
when a tipper gives inside information to a trading relative or friend, the
jury can infer that the tipper meant to the provide the equivalent of a cash
gift.56 Thus, one of the unsatisfactory aspects of Newman, Salman and
other remote tippee cases is a lack of reasoning as to why the tippee and
not the tipper were prosecuted.
The fiduciary principle by which the Supreme Court has limited
Section 10(b) insider trading cases is inadequate in at least three factual
situations-trading in advance of tender offers 7 ; leaks of information or
58trading on information by government officials ; and trading on hacked
information.5 9 These scenarios will be discussed below.
Many insider trading cases arise in the context of a contest for
control. While some prosecutions have proceeded under Section 10(b),
many have been combined with actions under Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act governing the conduct of tender offersi 0 Section 14(e) was
passed as part of the Williams Act in 1968, and is a self-operating
provision prohibiting the use of all fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative
53. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); see also Peter J. Henning, Supreme Court Shores Up Insider Trading
Law, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/business/dealbook/ supreme-
court-shores-up-insider-trading-law.html.
54. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 421-22.
55. Id.
56. Id at 428.
57. See Tender Offers, 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9957 (Feb. 15, 1979).
58. See Alan D. Jagolinzer et al., Political Connections and the Informativeness of Insider
Trades at 9 (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 222,
2016); see also Patrick Radden Keefe, The Empire of Edge, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/empire-edge; Roger Parloff, The Gray Art of Not
Quite Insider Trading, FORTUNE (Aug. 15, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/15/the-gray-art-of-not-
quite-insider-trading/.
59. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
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61
acts and practices in connection with a tender offer. In 1970, Congress
amended the Williams Act to give the SEC rulemaking power to define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 62 After the
Chiarella decision, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3, which provides that as
soon as any person "has taken a substantial step or steps to commence" a
tender offer, such action
shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Act for any
other person who is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer which information . . . has been acquired directly
or indirectly from the offering person . . . to purchase or sell
[securities of the target company]. 63
The SEC purposefully did not include a fiduciary duty requirement in Rule
14e-3, as this rule was designed in part to overcome the fiduciary principle
imposed by Chiarella in Section 14(e) cases.
The SEC proposed and adopted Rule 14e-3 as part of a large package
of rules designed to protect target company shareholders under the
Williams Act.65 Accordingly, it was not justified under the parity of
information rationale argued by the SEC earlier in Section 10(b) cases.
Rather, it imposed a disclose-or-abstain duty on tippees of potential
bidders in takeovers in order to protect target company shareholders.66
The SEC could eliminate some of the abuses of insider trading in
connection with tender offers by closing the ten-day window that allows
persons or groups who acquire five percent or more of a public
corporation's stock from filing a 13D report disclosing such a position for
ten days. 67 Although the SEC was given the authority to do so in Sarbanes-
61. Id.
62. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 91-567 (Dec. 22, 1970).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017); United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 710 F. Supp. 944, 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
64. Tender Offers, 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9977 (Feb. 15, 1979).
65. See id
66. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, 44 Fed. Reg. 70349, 70353 (Dec. 6, 1979);
see also U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 645 (1997).
67. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2007).
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Oxley, it has not exercised this authority.68 In my opinion, leaving the ten-
day window open is an inappropriate policy, as it prefers the interests of
activist investors over target company shareholders.69
Ultimately, Rule 14e-3 is a very narrow exception to the fiduciary
principle since it applies only to change of control transactions involving a
tender offer.70 Other tippee problems in the merger and acquisition arena
necessarily depend on Rule 10(b)(5) and, as demonstrated by the Newman
case, can result in failed prosecutions because of the restrictions of Dirks.
There have been few cases testing the scope or validity of Rule 14e-3.
In United States v. O'Hagan72 the Eighth Circuit took the position that
Rule 14e-3 exceeded the SEC's authority under the Exchange Act and that
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Section 10(b) should be
imported into any interpretation of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 because
the statutory language was essentially the same. The Supreme Court did
not agree with either of the Eighth Circuit's positions. 74 The defendant in
O'Hagan was an attorney who traded on information that he learned at his
law firm about an upcoming tender offer by a client of the firm.75 He was
convicted under Section 14(e). The Eighth Circuit overturned the
conviction, but the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, applying
the misappropriation theory. According to the majority opinion, a
"misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through
68. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204 (July 30, 2002), 116 Stat. 715, 788 (2002)
(The SEC did exercise its authority to accelerate reports by insiders as to their beneficial ownership
positions under Section 16(a)); see also 4 James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law
of Corporations § 24:2 (3d) at I (explaining that while the SEC advisory group has considered
amending the rules, no such change has taken place).
69. By leaving the ten-day window open, large activist investors are given the unfair opportunity
to acquire shares without the necessary disclosure that would help target company shareholders protect
their interests. In addition, this window threatens the stability of the company by preventing a proper
warning of unwanted prospective buyers.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
71. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014); but see Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 649-50 (1983).
72. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
73. Id. at 612-13.
74. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Id. at 649.
77. Id. at 666.
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deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously
harms members of the investing public." 78 Although this rationale would
seem to go beyond the fiduciary principle, the majority opinion adheres to
that principle, stating that
because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the
fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
nonpublic -information there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no
Section 10(b) violation.
This is a very strained rationalization of the property rights theory of the
inside information prohibition and makes little sense as applied to the facts
of O'Hagan and many other cases.so
With regard to Rule 14e-3, the Court in O'Hagan held that the rule was
a proper exercise of the SEC's authority to define and prescribe "means
reasonably designed to prevent" tender offer fraud.8 ' Further, a minority
opinion recognized that it might be difficult to prove that the trader with
inside information about a tender offer obtained such information in
breach of a duty. 82 Accordingly, the Court affirmed O'Hagan's conviction
under the rule.83
A different type of case involving trading based on hacking into a
computer system and trading on information thus obtained cannot be
prosecuted under the fiduciary principle since a hacker is not anyone's
fiduciary.m Nevertheless, some cases of this type have been successfully
prosecuted.85 In SEC v. Dorozhko the Second Circuit upheld such a
conviction on the theory that tricking the host system into believing that
78. Id at 656.
79. Id at 655.
80. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and the
Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information Is
Untenable, 59 BROOKLYN. L. REV. 149 (1993) (rejecting the idea of protecting inside information as
intellectual property and arguing for a balanced perspective on the law of insider trading where
prohibitions against trading on inside information are necessary to supplement the mandatory
disclosure regime in order to protect investors and the integrity of the public securities markets).
81. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673.
82. Id. at 697-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 677-78.
84. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
85. See id.
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access was authorized was a form of deception, making application of the
fiduciary principle unnecessary. Hacking could be a "deceptive device or
contrivance" within Sections 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.87 Subsequent hacking
cases have followed this reasoning.88 If any such cases reach other circuits
or the Supreme Court, it surely would require a form-over-substance
approach to find that trading on hacked information does not violate
Section 10(b).
In the STOCK Act of 2012 Congress provided for liability for insider
trading, enforceable by the SEC, on federal government officials,
including members of Congress.89 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
provides that congressional officials have:
[A] duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the
Congress, the United States Government and the citizens of the
United States with respect to material, nonpublic information
derived from such person's position as a Member of Congress or
employee of Congress or gained from the performance of such
person's official responsibilities."
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act imposes a similar duty on executive
and judicial branch employees.9 1 The SEC has not been very successful in
investigating or prosecuting cases pursuant to this authority.
Nevertheless, it would appear that many insider trading cases originate
from improper leaks of information about government actions. 93
Prior to the Chiarella decision, the SEC was arguing for an overly
86. Id.
87. Id. at 51.
88. See Leslie Picker, 3 Men Made Millions by Hacking Merger Lawyers, U.S. Says, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2016, at B1-B2.
89. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105; 126
Stat. 291.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(g)(1) (2012).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(h)(1).
92. See Martin O'Sullivan, House, SEC End Health Care Insider Trading Subpoena Row, LAW
360 (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/882785/house-sec-end-health-care-insider-
trading-subpoena-row; see also Craig Homan, Ph.D., The Impact of the STOCK Act on Stock Trading
Activity by U.S. Senators 2009-2-15, PUBLIC CITIZEN, June 22, 2017.
93. See Jagolinzer et al., supra note 58; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., Four
Charged In Scheme To Commit Insider Trading Based On Confidential Government Information
(May 24, 2017); see also Keefe, supra note 58; Parloff, supra note 58.
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broad doctrine for insider trading cases-the parity of information theory
that all players in the public securities market should have equal access to
information. 94 Justice Powell, a conservative and pro-business jurist,
seized upon this untenable formulation to introduce the fiduciary principle
into insider trading cases. 9 5 It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court
will delete the fiduciary principle from insider trading 10(b)(5) cases, even
though it is theoretically unsatisfactory and has been undermined by Rule
14e-3, the hacking cases and the STOCK Act.96 Statutory reform would
be a better solution to the problems discussed in this essay.
In 1987, there was a serious effort to define insider trading by statute.
A committee of securities lawyers suggested a definition that was then
introduced as part of The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987.97 The
bill provided that "information shall have been used or obtained
wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute,
directly or indirectly, theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of
any fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or other duty-
relationship of trust and confidence." 98 The SEC objected to this definition
as too narrow because it sought to outlaw trading when a person was in
possession of inside information. 99 After hearings, proposals introduced a
revised definition that would have prohibited trading by anyone in
possession of inside information, defined as information obtained by:
(A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic
or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other
relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual or
employment relationship.'
94. See. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
95. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 227-28 (1980).
96. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017); Stop
Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105; 126 Stat. 292.
97. S. 1380, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
98. Id.
99. See Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legis. Comm., 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep
(BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987).
100. Id.
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This effort to define insider trading by statute floundered because of
the possession versus use controversy and the SEC's lack of cooperation
with the legislative effort.101 Nevertheless, since the context of this
initiative was rampant, insider trading and other abuses by risk arbitragers
and others loosely connected with Michael Milken in the hot mergers and
acquisition market, Congress did pass the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.102 Among other things, this Act created a
private right of action on behalf of contemporaneous traders, 103 inserted a
bounty provision into the Exchange Act for persons providing information
about insider trading,10 and increased criminal fines for insider trading.105
Unfortunately, a definition of insider trading was left to the courts.'0
The prohibition against insider trading was injected into Section
10(b)(5) by the SEC and the courts. 107 The statute does not define insider
trading, and the courts therefore are free to structure this violation as they
choose.108 Although Congress has passed legislation, such as the 1988 Act
to increase sanctions for insider trading, it has not defined this crime. That
lack of a definition has troubled some jurists'09 and led to some of the
anomalies in interpreting the statute described below.
After the Newman decision, there was a flurry of activity in the
direction of a new effort to define insider trading by statute, which fizzled
out after the Salman decision and in view of the general deregulatory
climate in Washington.o10 Even before the Newman case the DOJ was
101. See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The "Possession Versus Use" Debate, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 239, 249 (1999); See also Roberta S. Karmel, A Critical Look at Insider Trading Policies, NEW
YORK LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 2015.
102. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the
1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 583 (2007).
103. Exchange Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2012).
104. Exchange Act § 21A, 15 U.S.C. 78u-l(e) (2012).
105. Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
106. Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining "Material, Nonpublic": What Should
Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 334-41 (2016)
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2012).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1.
109. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980). Justice Powell refused to
uphold the conviction of Chiarella because the misappropriation theory had not been argued in the
lower court. Id. at 236-37; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Justice Scalia
complained about lenity in the O'Hagan case. O Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679.
110. See The Second Circuit's Insider Trading Feud, WALL ST. J., Sept.18, 2017; See also Che
Odom, Congress Should Define 'Insider Trading': Ex-SEC Official, 48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 405 (Feb.
having difficulty in prevailing in some of its remote tippee insider cases.
Although the SEC may have put too much of its resources into insider
trading cases, especially remote tippee cases, over the years, the ban on
insider trading is important to investor confidence in the markets. Because
this is a criminal as well as a civil violation of the law, it should be
defined. One would hope that in a more enlightened atmosphere in
Washington than now exists, a statutory definition of insider trading could
be put into law. Further, such a definition would include duties of
confidentiality beyond fiduciary duty. The fiduciary principle is too
narrow and the misappropriation exception is based on a property rights
theory which has little to do with protecting investors.
24, 2016) (stating "[a] statute is needed to create some certainty in the law").
111. See Thomas 0. Gorman, SEC v. Cuban: Another Major Loss for the SEC, LEXISNEXIS, Oct.
17, 2013, https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/securities/b/securities/archive/2013/10/17/ sec-
v-cuban-another-major-loss-for-the-sec.aspx?Redirected~true; Nate Raymond, SEC Loses Insider
Trading Case Against New York Fund Manager, REUTERS (May 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-sec-insidertrading-idUSKBN0EA26Q20140530.
134 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 56:121
